Configuration 

All settings are managed through the TYPO3 Extension Configuration module:

Admin Tools > Settings > Extension Configuration > nr_passkeys_be

TYPO3 Extension Configuration screen for nr_passkeys_be showing all available settings

The extension configuration screen with all available settings grouped by category.

Relying Party settings 

rpId
type

string

Default

(auto-detected from HTTP_HOST)

The Relying Party identifier. This is typically the domain name of your TYPO3 installation (e.g. example.com). If left empty, it is auto-detected from the HTTP_HOST server variable.

rpName
type

string

Default

TYPO3 Backend

A human-readable name for the Relying Party. This is displayed to users during passkey registration (e.g. in the browser's passkey creation dialog).

origin
type

string

Default

(auto-detected)

The expected origin for WebAuthn operations (e.g. https://example.com). If left empty, it is auto-detected from the current request scheme and host.

Challenge settings 

challengeTtlSeconds
type

int

Default

120

The time-to-live for challenge tokens in seconds. After this period, the challenge expires and the user must request a new one. The default of 120 seconds provides enough time for users to interact with their authenticator.

Discoverable login 

discoverableLoginEnabled
type

bool

Default

true

Enable discoverable (identifierless) login. When enabled (default), the browser can suggest available passkeys without the user entering a username first (Conditional UI / Variant B). The user simply clicks a suggested passkey from the browser's autofill dropdown.

When disabled, users must enter their username first, then authenticate with their passkey (Variant A: username-first flow).

Password login control 

disablePasswordLogin
type

bool

Default

false

Enforce passkey-only authentication on a per-user basis. When enabled, password login is blocked only for users who have registered at least one passkey. Users without passkeys can still log in with a password, allowing gradual migration without lockouts.

This enables a smooth onboarding workflow:

  1. Admin creates a new backend user with a password (as usual).
  2. User logs in with password, registers a passkey in User Settings.
  3. From that point on, the user must use their passkey -- password login is no longer accepted for that account.

When this setting is active, users cannot remove their last passkey to prevent locking themselves out.

skipMfaOnPasskeyAuth
type

bool

Default

true

New in version 0.8.0

Added to resolve the MFA-policy dilemma: TYPO3's requireMfa flag applies to every authentication path, so requiring MFA for password users forced passkey users through a redundant TOTP step as well.

When enabled, TYPO3 credits a successful passkey assertion towards MFA only when its signed authenticator data confirms user verification (PIN or biometric). For presence-only assertions and for password logins, TYPO3 continues to apply its configured MFA policy.

On a fresh browser session, TYPO3 creates the account session after passkey verification. It can still prompt for the configured second factor. Include a signed-out browser in recovery drills and keep the configured MFA method available to administrators.

Recommended production combination (see Passkey Enforcement for details):

  1. Keep TYPO3's $GLOBALS['TYPO3_CONF_VARS']['BE']['requireMfa'] enabled so password-based logins still require a second factor.
  2. Enable skipMfaOnPasskeyAuth to credit user verification when TYPO3 preserves the session data during login.
  3. Use per-group enforcement to move users onto passkeys.
  4. Once adoption is high enough, enable disablePasswordLogin to close the password fallback.

Disable this setting only if your security policy explicitly mandates defence-in-depth with independent factors regardless of the primary factor's strength, or if a compliance standard you are bound to prescribes a separate MFA step.

Rate limiting 

rateLimitMaxAttempts
type

int

Default

10

Maximum number of requests allowed per IP address per endpoint within the rate limit window. Exceeding this limit returns HTTP 429 (Too Many Requests).

rateLimitWindowSeconds
type

int

Default

300

Duration of the rate limiting window in seconds. The attempt counter resets after this period.

Account lockout 

lockoutThreshold
type

int

Default

5

Number of consecutive failed authentication attempts before the account is temporarily locked. Applies per username/IP combination.

lockoutUserThreshold
type

int

Default

15

Total number of failed authentication attempts across all IP addresses before the account is locked. This threshold should be higher than lockoutThreshold to catch distributed brute force attacks where requests come from many different IP addresses.

lockoutDurationSeconds
type

int

Default

900

Duration of the account lockout in seconds (default: 15 minutes). After this period the lockout expires automatically. Administrators can also manually unlock accounts via the admin API.

Cryptographic algorithms 

allowedAlgorithms
type

string

Default

ES256

Comma-separated list of allowed signing algorithms for passkey registration. Supported values:

  • ES256 -- ECDSA with SHA-256 (recommended, widely supported)
  • ES384 -- ECDSA with SHA-384
  • ES512 -- ECDSA with SHA-512
  • RS256 -- RSA with SHA-256

Example for multiple algorithms: ES256,RS256

User verification 

userVerification
type

string

Default

required

The user verification requirement for WebAuthn ceremonies. Valid values:

  • required -- The authenticator must verify the user (e.g. biometric or PIN). This is the most secure option.
  • preferred -- The authenticator should verify the user if possible, but authentication proceeds even without verification.
  • discouraged -- The authenticator should not verify the user. Use this only if you want the fastest possible authentication.

Invalid values fall back to required.

Authentication policy failures 

If an error prevents loading the password policy or credential data, backend password authentication stops. Check the TYPO3 authentication log, verify the extension database schema and restore database access before retrying. Changing a group's enforcement level cannot restore a missing table. Test the recovery procedure with operator console access before enabling enforcement.