Feature: #97305 - Introduce CSRF-like request-token handling

See forge#97305

Description

A CSRF-like request-token handling has been introduced to mitigate potential cross-site requests on actions with side-effects. This approach does not require an existing server-side user session, but uses a nonce (number used once) as a "pre-session". The main scope is to ensure a user actually has visited a page, before submitting data to the web server.

This token can only be used for HTTP methods POST, PUT or PATCH, but for instance not for GET request.

New \TYPO3\CMS\Core\Middleware\RequestTokenMiddleware resolves request-tokens and nonce values from a request and enhances responses with a nonce value in case the underlying application issues one. Both items are serialized as JSON Web Token (JWT) hash signed with HS256. Request-tokens use the provided nonce value during signing.

Session cookie names involved for providing the nonce value:

  • typo3nonce_[hash] in case request served with plain HTTP

  • __Secure-typo3nonce_[hash] in case request served with secured HTTPS

Submitting request-token value to application:

  • HTTP body, e.g. in <form> via parameter __RequestToken

  • HTTP header, e.g. in XHR via header X-TYPO3-Request-Token

The sequence looks like the following:

1. Retrieve nonce and request-token values

This happens on the previous legitimate visit on a page that offers a corresponding form that shall be protected. The RequestToken and Nonce objects (later created implicitly in this example) are organized in the new \TYPO3\CMS\Core\Context\SecurityAspect.

use \TYPO3\CMS\Core\Context\Context;
use \TYPO3\CMS\Core\Security\RequestToken;
use \TYPO3\CMS\Fluid\View\StandaloneView;

class MyController
{
    protected StandaloneView $view;
    protected Context $context;

    public function showFormAction()
    {
        // creating new request-token with scope
        // 'my/process' and hand over to view
        $requestToken = RequestToken::create('my/process');
        $this->view->assign('requestToken', $requestToken)
            // ...
        }

    public function processAction()
    {
    }
}
<!-- in ShowForm.html template: assign request-token object for view-helper -->
<f:form action="process" requestToken="{requestToken}>...</f:form>

The HTTP response on calling the shown controller-action above will be like this:

HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Content-Type: text/html; charset=utf-8
Set-Cookie: typo3nonce_[hash]=[nonce-as-jwt]; path=/; httponly; samesite=strict

...
<form action="/my/process" method="post">
    ...
    <input type="hidden" name="__request_token" value="[request-token-as-jwt]">
    ...
</form>

2. Invoke action request and provide nonce and request-token values

When submitting the form and invoking the corresponding action, same-site cookies typo3nonce_[hash] and request-token value __RequestToken are sent back to the server. Without using a separate nonce in a scope that is protected by the client, corresponding request-token could be easily extracted from markup and used without having the possibility to verify the procedural integrity.

Middleware \TYPO3\CMS\Core\Middleware\RequestTokenMiddleware takes care of providing received nonce and received request-token values in \TYPO3\CMS\Core\Context\SecurityAspect. The handling controller-action needs to verify that the request-token has the expected 'my/process' scope.

class MyController
{
    protected \TYPO3\CMS\Fluid\View\StandaloneView $view;
    protected \TYPO3\CMS\Core\Context\Context $context;

    public function showFormAction() {}

    public function processAction()
    {
        $securityAspect = \TYPO3\CMS\Core\Context\SecurityAspect::provideIn($this->context);
        $requestToken = $securityAspect->getReceivedRequestToken();

        if ($requestToken === null) {
            // no request-token was provided in request
            // e.g. (overridden) templates need to be adjusted
        } elseif ($requestToken === false) {
            // there was a request-token, which could not be verified with the nonce
            // e.g. when nonce cookie has been overridden by another HTTP request
        } elseif ($requestToken->scope !== 'my/process') {
            // there was a request-token, but for a different scope
            // e.g. when a form with different scope was submitted
        } else {
            // request-token was valid and for the expected scope
            $this->doTheMagic();
            // middleware takes care to remove the the cookie in case no other
            // nonce value shall be emitted during the current HTTP request
            $requestToken->getSigningSecretIdentifier() !== null) {
                $securityAspect->getSigningSecretResolver()->revokeIdentifier(
                    $requestToken->getSigningSecretIdentifier()
                );
            }
        }
    }
}

Intercept & Adjust Request Token

Scenarios that are not using a login callback without having the possibility to submit a request-token, \TYPO3\CMS\Core\Authentication\Event\BeforeRequestTokenProcessedEvent can be used to generate the token individually.

use TYPO3\CMS\Core\Authentication\Event\BeforeRequestTokenProcessedEvent;
use TYPO3\CMS\Core\Security\RequestToken;

final class ProcessRequestTokenListener
{
    public function __invoke(BeforeRequestTokenProcessedEvent $event): void
    {
        $user = $event->getUser();
        $requestToken = $event->getRequestToken();
        // fine, there is a valid request-token
        if ($requestToken instanceof RequestToken) {
            return;
        }
        // validate individual requirements/checks
        // ...
        $event->setRequestToken(
            RequestToken::create('core/user-auth/' . strtolower($user->loginType))
        );
    }
}

Impact

In case a form is protected with the new request-token, actors have to visit the page containing the form before being able to actually submit data to the underlying server-side processing.

When working with multiple browser tabs, an existing nonce value (stored as session cookie in users' browser) might be overridden.

The current concept uses a \TYPO3\CMS\Core\Security\NoncePool which supports five different nonces in the same request. The pool purges nonces 15 minutes (900 seconds) after they have been issued.